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The Religious Employer Exemption Under Title 
VII: Should a Church Define 
Its Own Activities? 
In Vigars u. Valley Christian Center,' a librarian was 
presumably terminated by a parochial school for the sin of 
being pregnant out of wedlock. The district court precluded 
summary judgment until it determined whether the librari- 
an was terminated because she was pregnant or because 
she had an adulterous relationship. If she was terminated 
for adultery, then her religious employer was exempt under 
Title VII's provisions. However, if she was terminated for 
being pregnant, then the religious employer was liable un- 
der Title VII. 
The district court was interpreting the religious employ- 
er exemption: "This subchapter [Equal Employment Opportu- 
nities] shall not apply . . . to a religious corporation, associ- 
ation, educational institution, or society with respect to the 
employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform 
work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, 
association, educational institution, or society of its activi- 
ties."2 The court was concerned with whether under the 
exemption a religious employer could discriminate on a 
nonreligious basis such as gender. Religious employers are 
exempt from Title VII's prohibition of employment discrimi- 
nation3 in some circumstances. Courts have established that 
1. 805 F. Supp. 802 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 
2. 42 U.S.C. $ 2000e-l(a) (West Supp. 1994). Throughout this Comment 
these religious corporations, associations, educational institutions, and societies will 
be referred to collectively as religious employers. 
3. 42 U.S.C. $ 2000e-2(a) (West Supp. 1994). The statute states: 
I t  shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer: 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because 
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants 
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive 
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely 
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, 
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this religious employer exemption does not permit religious 
employers to discriminate on the basis of race, gender, or 
national originO4 However, a problem arises when determin- 
ing whether this exemption allows religious employers to 
adopt employment practices rooted in sincere religious belief 
and doctrine that have a disparate impact on or that facial- 
ly discriminate against individuals because of their race, 
sex, or national origin. 
The federal circuit courts are split on the extent of 
protection that religious employers receive under the exemp- 
tion. The Ninth and Fourth Circuits have read the exemp- 
tion narrowly, deciding that employment practices that vio- 
late Title VII on a nonreligious basis are prohibited regard- 
less of whether they are religiously based or not.5 Converse- 
ly, the Third and Fifth Circuits give the exemption a broad- 
er reading, holding that religious based employment practic- 
es should be given some deference, even when they violate 
Title VII on a nonreligious basis.6 
This Comment charts the history of the religious em- 
ployer exemption, the differing interpretations in the circuit 
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
4. Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 
1166 (4th Cir. 1985) ("While the language of [the exemption] makes clear that reli- 
gious institutions may base relevant hiring decisions upon religious preferences, 
Title VII does not confer upon religious organizations a license to make those same 
decisions on the basis of race, sex, or national origin."), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 
(1986); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir.) ("Congress did not 
intend that a religious organization be exempted from liability for discriminating 
against its employees on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin."), cert. 
denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972). 
5. For the Fourth Circuit position, consider Rayburn v. General Conference 
of Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1166 (4th Cir. 1985) ("The language and 
the legislative history of Title VII both indicate that the statute exempts religious 
institutions only to a narrow extent."), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986). For the 
Ninth Circuit position, consider EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 676 F.2d 
1272, 1277 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding that the argument for broadly exempting reli- 
gious employers is not supported by legislative history). 
6. For the Third Circuit position, consider Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 951 
(3rd Cir. 1991) ("With sensitivity to the constitutional concerns that would be 
raised by a contrary interpretation, we read the exemption broadly."). For the Fifth 
Circuit position, consider McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560-61 (5th 
Cir.) ("Congress did not intend, through the nonspecific wording of the applicable 
provisions of Title VII, to regulate the employment relationship between church 
and minister."), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972). The Fifth Circuit has more 
recently narrowed its view of the religious employer exemption. See cases cited 
infra note 58. 
RELIGIOUS EMPLOYER EXEMPTION 
courts, and proposes a solution relying on a recent Supreme 
Court decision,? the First Amendment religion clauses, and 
the language of the exemption. This Comment addresses the 
extent to which a religious employer has the right to deter- 
mine its own doctrine, goals, and method of pursuing those 
goals. Specifically, this Comment addresses the obligations of 
a religious employer under Title VII and whether the courts 
should obligate religious employers to change their religious- 
ly based employment practices to appease the dictates of 
Title VII. This Comment concludes that the obligations of a 
religious employer under Title VII should be based on 
whether the employment practice is religiously based rather 
than on whether the employment practice discriminates on a 
nonreligious basis o r  whether the activities of the employee 
in question are central to the religion's mission. 
11. THE RELIGIOUS EMPLOYER EXEMPTION UNDER THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 AS AMENDED IN 1972 
A. The Exemption Protects Religious Employers From the 
Full Effect of Title VII 
As originally enacted, the religious employer exemption 
under Title VII was fairly narrow. It covered "a religious 
corporation, association, or society with respect to employ- 
ment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work 
connected with the carrying on by such corporation, associa- 
tion or society of its religious activities."' However, in 1972, 
the exemption was broadened to exempt religious employers 
from Title VII in all of their activities, not just their reli- 
gious act i~i t ies .~ It is this 1972 broadening amendment 
which is viewed differently among the circuit courts. 
The Ninth Circuit has viewed the 1972 amendment as 
only a slight broadening of the exemption, holding that it 
did not "broadly exempt[] religious organizations from charg- 
es of discrimination based on nonreligious  ground^."'^ That 
7. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Lat- 
ter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U S .  327 (1987). 
8. 42 'U.S.C. !j 2000e-l(a) (1970) (emphasis added). 
9. 42 U.S.C. !j 2000e-l(a) (Supp. IV 1992) ("This subchapter shall not apply 
. . . to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with 
respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work 
c o ~ e c t e d  with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institu- 
tion, or society of its activities.") (emphasis added). 
10. EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1277 (9th Cir. 
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court explained, "Congress [has] consistently rejected propos- 
als to allow religious employers to discriminate on grounds 
other than religion."" Alternatively, the Third Circuit has 
read the exemption broadly, being "persuaded that Congress 
intended the explicit exemptions to Title VII to enable reli- 
gious organizations to create and maintain communities 
composed solely of individuals faithful to their doctrinal 
practices, whether or not every individual plays a direct role 
in the organization's 'religious a~tivities.'"'~ 
B. The Debates Over the Religious Employer Exemption Are 
at Best Inconclusive as to Whether the Exemption Should Be 
Read Broadly or Narrowly 
Although the conflicting circuits cite the legislative de- 
bates of the 1964 legislation and the 1972 amendment in 
support of their differing views,13 the debates are a t  best 
inconclusive. The 1964 Civil Rights Act, which originally 
passed the House, contained a broad exemption entirely 
excluding religious employers from the Act. l4 The Senate 
wrote a substitute bill which contained a more limited ex- 
emption allowing a religious organization to employ individ- 
uals of a particular religion only if they performed work 
connected with the organization's religious activities. After 
debate in the Senate this substitute bill was passed in both 
the Senate and the House? 
With respect to the 1972 amendment, some senators 
proposed that religious employers be completely removed 
from the jurisdiction of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commis~ion,'~ but these proposals were rejected.'? The 
subsequent Senate proposals only broadened the scope of the 
exemption to cover employees who performed nonreligious 
activities. This broadened exemption was proposed in an 
effort to allow religious organizations to create communities 
faithful to their religious  principle^.'^ These proposals were 
Id. 
Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 951 (3d Cir. 1991). 
See Pacific Press, 676 F.2d at 1276-77; Little, 929 F.2d at 949-51. 
H.R. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. § 703 (1963). 
110 CONG. REC. 12,812 (1964); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (1970). 
118 CONG. REC. 1982 (1972). 
Id. at 1995. 
See id. at 1994 (discussing the rights of parochial schools to hire only 
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enacted into law and remain with the current statute.lg A 
section by section analysis of the statute concluded that reli- 
gious employers remain "subject to the provisions of Title 
VII with regard to  race, color, sex, or national origin."20 
C. The Clause "Of a Particular Religion" Allows Religious 
Employers to Create Communities Consistent with Their 
Religious Beliefs 
The language "of a particular religion" is found in both 
the original and the amended versions of the e~emption.~' 
The Third Circuit found this language determinative and 
searched for a de f in i t i~n .~~  It looked to the definition of 
"religion" found in the The definition of "religion" 
under Title VII requires an employer to "reasonably accom- 
modate" an employee's religious practices unless it would 
cause "undue hardship" on the employer.24 The court deter- 
mined that this definition of "religion" should be read broad- 
ly, but did not find any indication in the legislative history 
that Congress considered the effects of this definition on the 
scope of the religious employer exemption.25 However, the 
Third Circuit concluded, "The permission to employ only per- 
sons 'of a particular religion' includes permission to employ 
persons whose beliefs and conduct are consistent with the 
employer's religious precepts."26 
members of their faith as  teachers). 
19. Id. at 7170; see 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-l(a) (West Supp. 1994). 
20. Id. at 7167. 
21. Compare 42 U.S.C. 2000e-l(a) (1970) with 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e-l(a) (West 
Supp. 1994) ("particular religions" is in both versions of the act). 
22. Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 950 (3rd Cir. 1991). 
23. 42 U.S.C. 5 2000e(j) (1988) (The statute states: "The term 'religion' in- 
cludes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an 
employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an 
employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue 
hardship on the conduct of the employer's business."). 
24. Id. 
25. Little, 929 F.2d at 950. 
26. Id. a t  951. 
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D. The Religious Employer Exemption Under Title VII 
Should Be Interpreted to Allow Religious Employers to Cre- 
ate Communities Consistent with Their Religious Beliefs 
1. The issues raised by the circuit courts ouerlook the more 
fundamental issue of religious autonomy 
When interpreting the religious employer exemption, the 
circuit courts have emphasized different aspects of the legis- 
lative history to give credibility to their respective interpre- 
tations. They seem to be grappling with the issue of wheth- 
er or not a religious employer in its employment practices 
can discriminate on a nonreligious ba~ i s .~ '  However, under 
the plain language of the exemption a religious employer 
may not discriminate on a nonreligious basis. An employer 
is only exempt from Title VII "with respect to the employ- 
ment of individuals of a particular religi~n."'~ Under the 
plain language of the statute religious employers are only 
exempt from Title VII when making employment decisions 
that are religiously based. Religious employers are still lia- 
ble under Title VII if their employment practice is based on 
a prohibited classification such as race, gender, or national 
origin. 
The circuit courts overlook the more fundamental ques- 
tion of whether religions have the right to pursue their own 
goals through their employment practices. More specifically, 
under Title VII, the question is whether religious employers 
are restricted by Title VII when their religiously based em- 
ployment practices, which presumably aid in the pursuit of 
religious goals, disparately impact on nonreligious protected 
groups. The circuit courts' discussions of whether the exemp- 
tion allows religious employers to discriminate on a non- 
religious basis overlook the more fundamental issue of reli- 
gious autonony and the right of religious employers to de- 
fine themselves through employment practices in ways con- 
sistent with their doctrines, even when those doctrines have 
a disparate impact on race, gender, or national origin. 
27. See infra part 111. 
28. 42 U.S.C. 8 2000e-l(a) (West Supp. 1994) (emphasis added). 
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2. Religious employers should be given autonomy to pursue 
their religious goals through their employment practices 
Without the religious employer exemption, a religious 
congregation would violate Title VII when it preferred a 
minister of its own faith, over one of another faith, purely 
on the basis of religion. The exemption a t  the very least 
seems aimed a t  allowing a religious employer to prefer one 
ministerial candidate over another, purely on the basis of 
religion.2g However, the application of the exemption is less 
clear when it is claimed by a religious employer hiring a 
janitor or librarian who the courts view to be less central to 
the religion's mission. The application of the exemption is 
even further clouded when i t  is claimed for an employment 
practice that has a disparate impact on race, gender, or na- 
tional origin. 
Although circuit courts apply the religious employer 
exemption differently in the above three situations, under 
the current exemption all three should be analyzed simi- 
larly. The religious employer exemption should be read to 
illustrate the principle of religious autonomy. The Supreme 
Court has articulated the principle that religions must be 
allowed to define their own doctrines, goals, and method of 
pursuing those goals in its church property decisions.30 
This principle rests on the religion clauses of the First 
29. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
30. See, e g . ,  Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (courts can settle church 
property disputes as long as there is "no consideration of doctrinal matters, wheth- 
er the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith"); Serbian E. Orthodox 
Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724 (1976) ("[Tlhe First and Fourteenth 
Amendments permit hierarchical religious organizations to establish their own rules 
and regulations for internal discipline and government."); Maryland & Va. 
Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God, 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970) (per 
curiam) (holding that because the state court's "resolution of the dispute involved 
no inquiry into religious doctrine," there was no violation of the First Amendment); 
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 
393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) ("First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when 
church property litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of con- 
troversies over religious doctrine and practice."); Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathe- 
dral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 363 U.S. 190, 190 (1960) (per curiam) (hold- 
ing that the use and occupancy of a cathedral were " strictly a matter of ecclesias- 
tical government' and as such could not constitutionally be impaired by a state 
statute"); Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church, 344 
U.S. 94, 107-08 (1952) ("Legislation that regulates church administration, the op- 
eration of the churches, the appointment of clergy, by requiring conformity to 
church statutes . . . prohibits the free exercise of religion."). 
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Amendment3' supported by recent federal statutory law.s2 
Under the Free Exercise Clause, religions are autonomous 
because a government regulation may not burden the free 
exercise of religion unless the government has a compelling 
interest in the subject of the r e g u l a t i ~ n . ~ ~  Likewise, under 
the Establishment Clause, religions are autonomous because 
(1) a statute must have a secular purpose, (2) the primary 
effect of the statute must neither advance nor inhibit reli- 
gion, and (3) the statute must not foster excessive entangle- 
ment between government and religioas4 
With these First Amendment principles and religious 
autonomy in mind, the application of the religious employer 
exemption is clearer. A religious employer must be allowed 
to determine who it will employ as a means of fulfilling its 
mission. S o  long as a religion's employment practices are an 
effort to fulfill its mission, it must be given the autonomy 
afforded by the First Amendment regardless of the activities 
performed by its employee or the disparate impact the prac- 
tices have on nonreligious protected groups. 
31. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an estab- 
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . ."). 
32. 42 U.S.C. 4 2000bb (West Supp. 1994). 
33. The test used to determine whether or not a statute violates the Free 
Exercise Clause was articulated in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) 
(noting that courts cannot uphold state action that imposes even an "incidental 
burden" on the free exercise of religion unless there exists a "compelling state 
interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to 
regulate*) (citations omitted); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) 
(First and Fourteenth Amendments prevent the state from compelling Amish par- 
ents t o  cause their children who have graduated from the eighth grade to attend 
formal high school.). 
The constitutional analysis of the First Amendment is in transition. Em- 
ployment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), has changed the analysis of the 
Free Exercise Clause. In that case the Court stated "the right of free exercise does 
not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law 
of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) con- 
duct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).'" Id. at 879 (citations omitted). The 
Religious Freedom Restoration A d  of 1993, 42 U.S.C. 4 2000bb (West Supp. 1994), 
is the congressional attempt to return to the Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. 
Yoder analysis, requiring the compelling state interest test to be applied when the 
government burdens a religion. Although it is questionable whether Congress can 
dictate constitutional analysis, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act codifies the 
compelling state interest test. Regardless of the constitutional analysis, the Free 
Exercise Clause continues to stand for the proposition that a religion should be 
allowed to dictate its own doctrine and practices without the burden of governmen- 
tal interference. Notwithstanding Employment Division v. Smith, this general propo- 
sition remains constant. 
34. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
RELIGIOUS EMPLOYER EXEMPTION 
111. THE ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS IN 
APPLYING THE RELIGIOUS EMPLOYER EXEMPTION 
The following cases illustrate the differing approaches of 
the circuit courts to the religious employer exemption. The 
cases are presented in chronological order by circuit to chart 
the development of the case law as well as the exemption. 
The facts in each case are significant because the activities 
held by the employees within the religious organization 
determine the outcome in the cases. 
A. The Fifth Circuit Distinguishes Between Employee Actiu - 
ities Within Religious Organizations to Alleviate First 
Amendment Violations Under Title V71 
McClure u. Salvation Army35 establishes an exception 
for ministers under Title VII which other circuit courts 
discuss in subsequent cases. This case was decided before 
the 1972 amendment to the religious employer exemption, s o  
the court had to decide whether the employment activities 
.involved were religious. McClure, a female minister, brought 
suit against the Salvation Army alleging discrimination on 
the basis of sex. Specifically, she received lower wages than 
similarly situated males.36 The court held that application 
of Title VII in this case would violate the First Amendment. 
According to the the religious employer exemp- 
tion was "intended to allow a religious organization to em- 
ploy persons of a particular faith to perform work connected 
with the carrying on of their religious activities without 
otherwise violating the provisions of Title VII."38 However, 
the court concluded that religions may not discriminate "on 
the basis of race, color, sex, and national origin."39 
Using the "compelling state interest7' test:' the court 
decided that application of Title VII in this case would 
violate the First Amendment. It found that "[tlhe relation- 
ship between an organized church and its minsters is its 
35. 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972). 
36. Id. at 555. 
37. Note that this case was decided before the 1972 amendment broadened 
the exemption to cover all activities of religious employers, rather than strictly 
religious activities. See 42 U.S.C. $ 2000e-l(a) (1970). 
38. McClure, 460 F.2d at 558. 
39. Id. 
40. See supra note 33. 
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lifeblood. The minister is the chief instrument by which the 
church seeks to fulfill its purpose. Matters touching this 
relationship must necessarily be recognized as of prime 
ecclesiastical concern."41 The court found that a minister's 
salary, assignments, and duties are "matters of church ad- 
ministration and government and thus, purely of ecclesias- 
tical cognizance" and that a review of these practices and 
decisions would "cause the State to intrude upon matters of 
church administration and government which have so many 
times before been proclaimed to be matters of singular ec- 
clesiastical concern."42 The court concluded that Congress 
did not intend to "regulate the employment relationship 
between church and minister."43 
While interpreting the religious employer exemption 
before the 1972 amendment, which broadened the exemption 
to cover all of a religious employer's activities rather than 
just its religious activit ie~?~ the Fifth Circuit saw the need 
to create an exception for ministers. This exception is a 
manifestation of the right of religions to be autonomous. 
The court found that religions have a First Amendment 
right to determine the qualifications and compensation for 
their ministers without governmental regulation. To hold 
otherwise would infringe on religious autonomy and require 
religions t o  change employment practices, conceivably based 
on religious doctrine, thereby infringing on the First Amend- 
ment religion clauses. The 1972 amendment to the religious 
employer exemption seems to remove the need for the min- 
isterial exception because it protects all activities of religious 
employers, not just the religious activities. Nevertheless, the 
ministerial exception continues beyond the 1972 amendment. 
41. McClure, 460 F.2d at 558-59. 
42. Id. at 560. 
43. Id. at 560-61. 
44. See 42 U.S.C. $ 2000e-l(a) (1970). 
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B. If a Religious Employer's Employment Practice Infringes 
on a Nonreligious Classification, the Ninth Circuit Only 
Allows a Religious Employer T o  Violate Title VII when the 
Employee's Activities Are Ministerial 
1. EEOC v. Pacific Press Publishing Association 
The Ninth Circuit refuses to interpret the 1972 amend- 
ment as removing the need for a ministerial exception by 
reading the religious employer exemption narrowly when it 
impacts nonreligious protected groups. EEOC v. Pacific Press 
Publishing A ~ s ' n ~ ~  illustrates the problems created when 
courts disallow religions the autonomy they are entitled to 
under the First Amendment religion clauses. Pacific Press, a 
nonprofit religious publishing house, required all of its em- 
ployees to be members of the Seventh-Day Adventists 
Church in good standing.46 Lorna Tobler, a female editorial 
secretary, had worked for the publishing company for fifteen 
years.47 Pacific Press paid its employees according to a 
written wage scale which provided married males a higher 
rental allowance than single males who received a higher 
allowance than females whether married or unmarried. 
Tobler brought an action against Pacific Press for the dispa- 
rate wage scale. 
After Pacific Press discovered that Tobler had initiated 
charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis- 
sion, her discretionary work load was shifted to other em- 
ployees, presumably in retaliation for her complaints. Tobler 
then filed retaliation charges against the publishing compa- 
ny as well.48 The General Conference of Seventh-Day 
Adventists, the governing body of the church, formed a com- 
mittee that recommended that Tobler and another female 
employee who was pursuing charges against it be terminat- 
ed from Pacific Press. In accordance with internal proce- 
dures, this committee found that both employees had failed 
to meet the high standards of biblical teachings and church 
authority because they had filed suit against the church, 
were a t  variance with the church, and were unresponsive to 
45. 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1982). 
46. Id. at 1274. 
47. Id. at 1275. 
48. Id. 
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co~nse l ing .~~  Both of these actions by Pacific Press were 
violations of Title VII, so the Equal Employment Opportuni- 
ty Commission brought suit. The district court found the 
disparate wage scale and the retaliation to be violations of 
Title VII.50 
The court addressed two issues in this case: 
First, whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 prohibits a religious publishing house from (a) dis- 
criminating in wages because of sex, and (b) retaliating 
against and ultimately discharging an employee because of 
her participation in Title VII proceedings. Second, whether 
application of Title VII in the context of this case infringes 
the Free Exercise and Establishment clauses [sic] of the 
First A~nendment.~' 
Pacific Press argued that it was exempt as a religious em- 
ployer from the provisions of Title VII and, alternatively, 
that application of Title VII in this case violated the First 
Amendment religion clauses.52 
For its analysis of whether Title VII prohibits the pub- 
lishing company's actions, the court looked to NLRB u. 
Catholic Bishop of Chicago.53 That Supreme Court decision 
mandated that a court first determine whether the proposed 
application of Title VII "would give rise to serious constitu- 
tional  question^.'"^ If the proposed application of !Me  VII 
did give rise to serious constitutional questions, then the 
court could only apply the statute in the proposed way if 
there was an "affxmative intention of Congress clearly ex- 
pressed" t o  do so.55 
The court concluded that Pacific Press was not expressly 
or implicitly exempt from the provisions of Title VII in this 
case. The court read the exemption narrowly, allowing reli- 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 1274. 
51. Id. at 1275. 
52. Id. at 1276. 
53. 440 U.S. 490 (1979). In CathoLic Bishop, the Court held that a religious- 
ly associated school was not within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB) and that there would be a significant risk of infringement on the 
religion clauses of the First Amendment if jurisdiction were found. In light of such 
a risk, there must be clear congressional intent of NLRB jurisdiction to find such 
jurisdiction. Id. 
54. Id. at 501. 
55. Id. 
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gious employers to discriminate on the basis of religious 
faith, but holding that such employers are "not immune 
from liability for discrimination based on race, sex, national 
origin, or for retaliatory actions against employees who exer- 
cise their rights under the statute."56 The court cited con- 
gressional debate on the exemption and its broadening 
amendment5? and Fifth Circuit case law to support its de- 
termination that Congress "intended to  prohibit religious 
organizations from discriminating among their employees on 
the basis of race, sex or national origin."58 
Pacific Press argued that Tobler was outside the reach 
of Title VII since her job involved religious activities includ- 
ing "discretionary and administrative respon~ibilities."~~ Un- 
der McClure v. Salvation Armye0 and NLRB v. Catholic 
Bishop of Chicago, Pacific Press alternatively argued that 
application of Title VII violated the First Amendment.e1 
The court rejected the Pacific Press argument that the reli- 
gious employer exemption "applies to all actions taken by an 
employer with respect to an employee whose work is con- 
nected with the organizations 'religious activitie~.'"~~ The 
court found that "Tobler was not a minister, nor an author 
of religious texts. Moreover, Press has not shown that her 
duties go t o  the heart of the church's function in the man- 
ner of a minister or a seminary teacher."63 The court con- 
cluded that Congress clearly intended Title VII to apply t o  
Pacific Press when it discriminated against Tobler. 
56. Pacific Press, 676 F.2d at  1276. 
57. Id. at 1276-77. 
58. Id. at 1277 (citing EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 
651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that Title VII did not apply to the employ- 
ment relationship between the seminary and its faculty, but that applying Title 
VII's reporting requirements to the seminary's nonministerial employees did not 
violate the religion clauses of the First Amendment), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905 
(1982); and EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding 
that when a religious institution presents clear and convincing evidence that an 
employment practice results "from discrimination on the basis of religion," then the 
EEOC has no "jurisdiction to investigate further to determine whether the religious 
discrimination was a pretext for some other form of discrimination"; only the rela- 
tionship between minister and the church is exempt from Title VII; imposing Title 
VII requirements on a religious institution does not violate the religion clauses of 
the First Amendment), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981)). 
59. Pacific Press, 676 F.2d at  1277. 
60. See supra part IIIA. 
61. Pacific Press, 676 F.2d a t  1277. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 1278. 
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In using the "compelling state interest" the 
court decided that the enforcement of equal pay provisions 
on Pacific Press did not conflict with its religious beliefs 
because the church "proclaims that it does not believe in 
discriminating against women or minority groups, and that 
its policy is to pay wages without discrimination on the ba- 
sis of race, religion, sex, age, or national s rig in."^ The 
court found that the state interest in this case was high 
and the impact on religious belief was minimal and so con- 
cluded that the Free Exercise Clause was not violated with 
respect t o  the equal pay provisions of Title VII? 
The court had more difficulty determining whether ap- 
plication of the retaliatory provisions of Title VI167 violated 
the Free Exercise Clause. The court found that there was a 
substantial impact on the religious beliefs of the Adventists 
Church when the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis- 
sion prosecuted Pacific Press for taking retaliatory action 
based on religious doctrine." The court concluded, however, 
that the compelling state interest found in Title VII justified 
this substantial impact on religious belief and that the Free 
Exercise Clause was not violated by applying Title VII to 
the retaliatory actions of Pacific Press?' 
The court also found that application of Title VII in 
this case did not violate the Establishment Clause by using 
the test articulated in Lemon u. Kurtzman." That Supreme 
Court decision provides a three-step analysis to determine 
whether a statute complies with the Establishment Clause: 
64. See supra note 33. 
65. Pacific Press, 676 F.2d at  1279. 
66. Id. 
67. 42 U.S.C. $ 2000e-3(a) (1981). The statute states: 
I t  shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to dis- 
criminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for 
an employment agency, or joint labor-management committee controlling 
apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training 
programs, to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organiza- 
tion to discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for member- 
ship, because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment 
practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, 
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or 
hearing under this subchapter. 
68. 676 F.2d at 1279. 
69. Id. at 1279-80. 
70. 403 US. 602 (1971). 
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(1) the statute must have a secular purpose, (2) the primary 
effect of the statute must neither advance nor inhibit reli- 
gion, and (3) the statute must not foster excessive govern- 
ment entanglement with religi~n.~'  The court focused on 
whether application of Title VII in this case fostered exces- 
sive government entanglement with religion. 
Pacific Press argued that application of Title VII in this 
case would excessively entangle the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission with religion. To determine this 
question the court looked at "the character and purpose of 
the institution involved, the nature of the regulation's intru- 
sion into church affairs, and the resulting relationship be- 
tween the government and the religious a ~ t h o r i t y . " ~ ~  Pacific 
Press supported their argument by citing NLRB u. Catholic 
Bishop of Chicago,73 in which the Supreme Court found a 
serious risk of excessive entanglement between the National 
Labor Relations Board and religion by enforcing mandatory 
collective bargaining provisions a t  a religious school.74 The 
court distinguished Catholic Bishop from the present case 
finding that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
had less authority to continuously supervise than the Na- 
tional Labor Relations Board did.75 The court found that  
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission could not 
initiate suits to enforce its statutory provisions or issue 
coercive orders like the National Labor Relations Board.76 
Therefore, the court found no excessive entanglement be- 
tween the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and 
the Adventists Church by applying Title VII to Pacific Press 
with regard to the equal pay or retaliatory  provision^.^^ 
2. The Ninth Circuit risked influencing religious doctrine 
contrary to the First Amendment religion clauses 
The Ninth Circuit in Pacific Press infringed upon reli- 
gion to a greater degree than they seem to have understood. 
The court found that the First Amendment religion clauses 
71. Id. at 612-13. 
72. Pacific Press, 676 F.2d at 1282 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 
614-15 (1971)). 
73. 440 U.S. 490 (1979). 
74. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U S .  at 502-03. 
75. Pacific Press, 676 F.2d at 1282. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
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were not infringed when a religious employer was forced to 
alter its employment practices that were arguably religiously 
based. By forcing a religious employer to alter its employ- 
ment practices, the court was tampering with the doctrines 
and practices of the religion itself. As Professor Douglas 
Laycock has stated, "When the state interferes with the 
autonomy of a church, and particularly when i t  interferes 
with the allocation of authority and influence within a 
church it interferes with the very process of forming the 
religion as it will exist in the future.'y78 
This case substantially limits the autonomy of religion. 
By scrutinizing and essentially overturning a religious 
employer's decisions, the court is limiting the religion's abili- 
ty to fulfill its religious mission through its employment 
practices, simply because the practices do not meet the 
court's definition of religious activity. Under this analysis, 
courts infringe on the right to freely exercise religion and 
possibly entangle themselves in determining religious doc- 
trine. 
The Ninth Circuit seemed to neglect the fact that the 
employment practices of religious employers are often reli- 
giously based and so are a form of religious practice. The 
court seemed willing to permit the Title VII violation if 
Tobler had been a minister, but since she was only an 
editorial secretary the court was not willing to do so. By 
determining which positions were ministerial and central to 
the religion, the court was dictating how the religion would 
define itself and who it would employ to fulfill its mission. 
Likewise, the court ignored the plain language of the 
statute, which makes no distinction based on the activities 
performed by the employee. In this manner the court risked 
becoming the interpreter of religious practice and a fdter 
through which employment-related religious practices must 
pass. Under such a system, if the practice does not meet 
the political touchstone, then the court condemns the prac- 
tice, thereby influencing the doctrine and forcing religions to 
redetermine their missions. This sort of corruption of reli- 
gious practice and doctrine is contrary to the express intent 
of the First Amendment religion clauses. 
78. Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The 
Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1373, 1391 (1981). 
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Employment practices that are religiously based are an 
exercise of religion, regardless of the employee's activities 
within the religious community. Even an  editorial secretary, 
like Lorna Tobler, reflects the religious community when she 
works for a church-affiliated publishing company. It does not 
make a difference whether she edits religious or secular 
text, she is still a member of the religious community. As 
such she may confront sensitive church issues or deal in  
matters that only the faithful would respect. Under religious 
autonomy the religion alone should decide which employees 
and which activities necessitate close religious affiliation. 
As Professor Stephen L. Carter has stated, "religions, to 
be truly free, must be able to engage in practices that the 
larger society condemns. The state has a perfect right to 
send a message that it is wrong to discriminate . . . but 
government must not be allowed to conscript private organi- 
zations, least of all religions, to assist."79 Continuing, he 
stated that religious autonomy and independence are what 
"the First Amendment traditions contemplate and democracy 
desperately needs."' He defined religious autonomy as 
meaning that religions "should not be beholden to the secu- 
lar world, that they should exist neither by the forbearance 
of, nor to do the bidding of, the society outside of them- 
selves. I t  means, moreover that they should be unfettered in  
preaching resistance to (or support of or indifference toward) 
the existing order."" 
Religious autonomy permits religions to define them- 
selves as they see fit, which is essential to their right to 
freely exercise their religion. When the courts influence reli- 
gious practice and doctrine by invalidating religiously based 
employment practices, they run the risk of making religion 
meaningless and turning the state's political policies into a 
state religion by defining each religion within the state's 
political agenda. 
79. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISRELIEF 34 (1993). On the issue 
of employment discrimination by religious employers Professor Carter advocates fo- 
cusing on whether employee activities are "central acts of faith of a religious com- 
munity." Id. at 143. However, his arguments supporting religious autonomy reach 
the opposite conclusion; and, his analysis based on employee activities is inconsis- 
tent with the plain language of the religious employer exemption. See 42 U.S.C. 8 
2000e-l(a) (West Supp. 1994). 
80. CARTER, supra note 78, at 34. 
81. Id. at 34-35. 
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3. Religious employers may have valid reasons for observ- 
ing employment practices that are contrary to their oficial 
doctrine 
The Ninth Circuit argued that there was no Free Exer- 
cise violation against the Adventists Church, because their 
own doctrine was contrary to their employment practi~e. '~ 
However, the free exercise of religion and the right of re- 
ligious autonomy are founded on the principle of fluidity of 
religious doctrine. Religious employers may have religiously 
based reasons for observing an employment practice that is 
contrary to the official pronounced doctrine. Official pro- 
nouncement of doctrine may not be "a reliable indication of 
what the faithful believe. At best the officially promulgated 
doctrine of large denominations represents the dominant or 
most commonly held view; it cannot safely be imputed to 
every believer or every affiliated congregati~n."~~ 
Likewise, many religions profess to be governed by di- 
vine revelation, which may change with different situations. 
Inherent in the right to freely exercise religion is the right 
to freely change beliefs. Organizations that profess to be 
governed by a higher law must be afforded the latitude to 
change their official pronouncements as they see fit. The 
right to freely exercise religion must include the right to act 
contrary to official pronouncements when moved upon by 
God to do so. Although it would be more difficult for a 
religious employer to show that its employment practice, 
which is contrary to the official doctrines of the religion, is 
religiously based, the religion should be given the opportuni- 
ty to do so. 
Moreover, as Professor Laycock has argued, religious 
organizations may have constitutionally legitimate reasons 
for resisting regulations that comply with their official doc- 
trines. First, they may simply be "hypocritically seeking t o  
exempt themselves from a moral duty they preach to oth- 
e r~ . ' "~  Although not admirable, this position is still con- 
stitutionally permissible because the "free exercise protection 
is not limited to churches the government admires.yy85 Sec- 
ond, religions may be resisting regulations on principle--"to 
82. See Pacific Press, 676 F.2d at 1279. 
83. Laycock, supra note 77. 
84. Id. at 1399. 
85. Id. 
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avoid creating an adverse precedent that might support 
some more objectionable regulation in the future."86 Third, 
"[elven if government policy and church doctrine endorse the 
same broad goal, the church has a legitimate claim to au- 
tonomy in the elaboration and pursuit of that goaYs7 Un- 
der this autonomy right, deference must be given to reli- 
giously based employment practices, even when those prac- 
tices seem inconsistent with the religion's official pronounce- 
ments. 
4. Vigars v. Valley Christian Center 
The Northern District Court of California in Vigars u. 
Valley Christian Centers8 followed EEOC u. Pacific Press 
Publishing Ass'n. In that case Vigars, a librarian, was alleg- 
edly fired from a parochial school for being pregnant out of 
wedlock. When the school moved for summary judgment on 
the Title VII action, it alleged that the termination was not 
for the sin of pregnancy out of wedlock, but for the sin of 
adultery.89 The court decided that if Vigars was terminated 
for being pregnant out of wedlock then Title VII applied, 
but if the termination was for adultery, then Title VII did 
not apply. The court stated, "[Ilt is clear that Title VII 
generally applies when a woman has been terminated for 
pregnancy, regardless of the reason put forth by the employ- 
er as to why that pregnancy justifies terminati~n.'~' 
The district court found that under Pacific Press "church 
organizations have been held liable under Title VII for bene- 
fit and employment decisions which they contended were 
based upon religious grounds but which also discriminated 
against women based on sex."g1 However, the district 
court's finding is contrary to the Ninth Circuit's finding in 
Pacific Press that the Adventists Church did not have a 
religiously held belief of discrimination against women.92 
Finally, the court decided that Title VII did not violate the 
First Amendment. It decided that summary judgement must 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. 805 F.  Supp. 802 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 
89. Id. at 804-5. 
90. Id. at 806. 
91. Id. a t  807. 
92. Pacific Press, 676 F.2d a t  1279. See supra text accompanying note 65. 
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be denied because there is a legitimate issue of material 
fact as to whether the school terminated Vigars for being 
pregnant or for committing ad~l tery. '~  
The Northern District of California found that a reli- 
gious employer could not put forth a reason sufficient to 
terminate an employee for pregnancy, but that termination 
for adultery was acceptable. This is the sort of arbitrary 
distinction that courts make when permitted to scrutinize 
the employment practices of religious employers. With this 
decision the court is preferring one employment practice 
over another. Although generally such preference is proper, 
when a religious employer is involved the court risks prefer- 
ring one doctrine over another as they are manifest in em- 
ployment practices. 
Employment practices are central to the fulfillment of 
religious missions for two reasons. First, they may be ex- 
pressions of religious belief and as such are part of the 
exercise of religion. Second, they create communities that 
are working to fulfill religious missions. When courts exer- 
cise power over the employment practices of a religious 
employer, they risk changing the expression of religious 
belief and the creation of communities to fulfill religious 
missions. Although the district court may need to determine 
whether Vigars was terminated for being pregnant out of 
wedlock or committing adultery, the case should not turn on 
this issue. Rather, it  should turn on whether the employ- 
ment practice is religiously based (regardless of whether i t  
condemns pregnancy out of wedlock or adultery). 
Under the plain language of the religious employer 
exemption and its legislative history, religious employers 
may not discriminate on a nonreligious basis. The ministeri- 
al exception of McClure v. Salvation Army and the First 
Amendment religion clauses prohibit the application of Title 
VII to positions that are central to a religion's mission. The 
plain language of the exemption also protects religious em- 
ployers regardless of whether the activities involved are 
secular or religious. Therefore, since the analysis cannot 
focus on the activities involved, it must focus on the em- 
93. Vigars, 805 F. Supp. at 810. The district court also considered Little v. 
Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1991) and Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of The 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987), but 
found both inapplicable in the current case. See infra parts III.D., IVA. 
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ployment practice itself. The court's focus should be on 
whether an employment practice is part of a religion's exer- 
cise of religion. If it is, then it should be given deference. If 
the employment practice is not religiously based, then no 
deference should be given to  the employment practice and it 
should be treated the same as any other employment 
practice of any other employer. 
C. The Fourth Circuit Perpetuates the Focus on the 
Employee Activities Rather than on the Basis 
of the Employment Practice 
The Fourth Circuit in Rayburn v. General Conference of 
Seventh-Day Adventistsg4 interpreted the religious employer 
exemption based on the activities of the employee, rather 
than on the religious basis for the employment practice. 
Rayburn, a female pastor who was denied a position, 
brought a n  action charging sexual and racial 
discrirninati~n.~~ In applying the NLRB v. Catholic Bishop 
of Chicago ~tandard,~"he court determined that "the lan- 
guage and the legislative history of Title VII both indicate 
that the statute exempts religious institutions only to a 
narrow extent."g7 
Citing EEOC u. Mississippi College,Q8 from the Fifth 
Circuit, the court stated that when a religious institution 
presents clear and convincing evidence that an employment 
practice favors one religion over another, then the religious 
exemption of Title VII deprives the EEOC from further 
investigation to determine whether the religious discrimina- 
tion is a "pretext for some other form of discriminati~n."~~ 
The court continued that it was clear from the exemp- 
tion that religious employers can discriminate on the basis 
of religion, but that "Title VII does not confer upon religious 
organizations a license to  make those same decisions on the 
basis of race, sex, or national origin."loO The court viewed 
this case as discrimination on the basis of race and gender 
772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 US. 1020 (1986). 
Id. at 1165. 
See supra text of note 53. 
Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1166. 
626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980). 
Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1166. 
Id. 
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among applicants of the same religion, so, by the clear 
intent of Congress, Title VII applied to this case.lO' 
Using the "compelling state interest" test,''' the court 
found that applying Title VII in this case would violate the 
Free Exercise Clause. It reasoned, "The role of an associate 
in pastoral care is so significant in the expression and real- 
ization of Seventh-day Adventist beliefs that state interven- 
tion in the appointment process would excessively inhibit 
religious liberty."103 However, the court found that "Title 
VII is an interest of the highest order" and therefore some 
occasions arise when "the state may justify an inroad on 
religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive 
means of achieving some compelling state interest."lo4 
The court also found that application of Title VII in 
this case would violate the Establishment Clause. It stated 
that "the application of Title VII to employment decisions of 
this nature would result in an intolerably close relationship 
between church and state."lo5 However, the court noted, 
"churches are not-and should not be-above the law. . . . 
Their employment decisions may be subject to Title VII 
scrutiny, where the decision does not involve the church's 
spiritual functi~ns."''~ The court decided that Title VII 
was not applicable to the employment practices of religions 
concerning their pastors even when the practices discrimi- 
nated on the basis of nonreligious criteria.lo7 
In this case, the Fourth Circuit did not apply Title VII 
to the religious employer discriminating on a nonreligious 
basis only because the employee's activities were closely tied 
to the religion's mission. The court relied on the First 
Amendment religion clauses, misinterpreting the religious 
employer exemption. Even though this analysis resulted 
favorably for the religious employer in this case, i t  distin- 
guished the protection that religious employers received on 
the basis of the activities performed by the employee. This 
implies that employees whose activities the court views as 
101. Id. at 1166-67 & n.2. 
102. See supra note 33. 
103. Rayburn, 772 F.2d a t  1168. 
104. Id. at 1169 (citing Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Employment Sec. 
Div., 450 US. 707 (1981)). 
105. Id. at 1170. 
106. Id. at 1171. 
107. Id. at 1172. 
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further removed from the religion's mission would not re- 
ceive protection under the religious employer exemption. 
However, the plain language of the exemption protects both 
the secular and the religious activities of religious employ- 
ees, regardless of their centrality to the religion's mission. 
Instead of focusing on centrality, the court should focus on 
whether the employment practice is religiously based, com- 
pletely distancing itself from the centrality of the employee's 
activities. 
D. The Third Circuit Focuses on Whether the Employment 
Practice is Religiously Based Rather than on Whether 
the Employee's Activities Are Central 
to a Religion's Mission 
The Third Circuit in Little v. Wuer1108 focused on the 
basis for the employment decision, rather than on the activi- 
ties of the employee, when applying the religious employer 
exemption. In this case Susan Long Little was a Protestant 
teacher a t  a Catholic school.10g She brought suit under 
Title VII when the school failed to renew her c~nt rac t . "~  
The St. Mary Magdalene Parish, the operator of the school, 
hired Little with full awareness that she was Protes- 
tant."' Little did not teach religion, but attended and par- 
ticipated in ceremonies and programs that were intended to 
strengthen the Catholic values of the  student^."^ She was 
a tenured teacher and assumed that her contract would be 
renewed unless there was just cause for her termina- 
tion.ll3 There is no dispute that Little performed well in 
her teaching capacity.ll4 The annual contracts contained a 
clause that gave the school the right to dismiss a teacher 
for "serious public immorality, public scandal, or public re- 
jection of the official teachings, doctrine or laws of the Ro- 
man Catholic Church."l15 
108. 929 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1991). 
109. Id. at 945. 
110. Id. at 946. 
111. Id. at 945. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 945-46. 
114. Id. at 945. 
115. Id. 
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Little was married when hired? Later, she was &- 
vorced and during a leave of absence was remarried by a 
justice of the peace to a second husband who was a bap- 
tized, but nonpracticing, member of the Catholic Church.l17 
When Little tried to renew her contract with the school, she 
was told that she would not be rehired because she had not 
pursued "the 'proper canonical process available from the 
Roman Catholic Church to obtain validation of her second 
marriage.' "'18 Little filed suit. The district court granted 
the school's summary judgment motion, finding that the 
religious employer exemption exempted the school from lia- 
bility under Title VII.llg 
The court used the Catholic  ish hop'^' standard to de- 
termine the applicability of Title VII to this case. The court 
first decided whether the Free Exercise Clause was violated. 
Relying on several cases analyzed above,12' the court rec- 
ognized the ministerial exception found in the circuit court 
decisions. It stated, "Title VII does not apply to the rela- 
tionships between ministers and the religious organizations 
that employ them, even where discrimination is alleged on 
the basis of race or sex."122 The court broadened the im- 
pact of this ministerial exception, stating, "!L'itle VII has 
been interpreted to bar race and sex discrimination by reli- 
gious organizations towards their nonminister employees. 
But attempting to forbid religious discrimination against 
nonminister employees where the position involved has any 
religious significance is uniformly recognized as constitution- 
ally suspect, if not forbidden."lu 
The court also recognized the test found in Mississippi 
College: when a religious organization "presents convincing 
evidence that the challenged employment practice resulted 
from discrimination on the basis of religion," then the reli- 
gious exemption "deprives the Equal Employment Opportuni- 




120. 440 U.S. 490 (1979). See supra note 53. 
121. The court relied on Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day 
Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986); and 
McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 
(1972). See supra parts 1II.A-C. 
122. Little, 929 F.2d at 947. 
123. Id. at 947-48 (emphasis added). 
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ty Commission of jurisdiction to investigate further to deter- 
mine whether the religious discrimination was a pretext for 
some other form of dis~rimination."'~~ The court deter- 
mined that there is grave danger in a court determining 
who fits into certain religious categories, and that this de- 
termination is better left to the discretion of religious au- 
thorities and  government^.'^^ I t  determined that to apply 
Title VII in this case, it would have to examine the official 
teachings and doctrines of the Catholic Church, which raises 
serious constitutional  question^.'^^ 
The court found that applying Title VII to the school's 
decisions would "create excessive government entanglement 
with religion" violating the Lemon test.12' As support for 
this argument the court turned again to Catholic Bishop, in  
which the Supreme Court decided that the National Labor 
Relations Board is presumed to have no jurisdiction over 
parochial school employees. The court found that the "very 
process of inquiry leading to findings and conclusions" 
brings excessive entanglement.12' The court quoted from 
Professor Douglas L a y c ~ c k ' ~ ~  that "churches have a consti- 
tutionally protected interest in managing their own institu- 
tions free of government interference."lsO Thus, the court 
concluded that interpreting Title VII to apply to the school's 
decision may only be done when Congress has shown clear 
intent to do so. 
In looking at  the legislative history of Title VII, the 
court determined that it "suggest[ed] that the sponsors of 
the broadened exception were solicitous of religious 
organizations' desire to create communities faithful to their 
religious  principle^."'^^ The court continued, "[Wle are also 
persuaded that Congress intended the explicit exemptions to 
Title VII to enable religious organizations to create and 
maintain communities composed solely of individuals faithful 
124. EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477, 485 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981), quoted in Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 948 (3d Cir. 
1991). 
125. Little, 929 F.2d at 948. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 949. 
129. Laycock, supra note 77, at 1373. 
130. Little, 929 F.2d at 949. 
131. Id. at 950. 
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to doctrinal  practice^."'^^ The court concluded that "it does 
not violate Title VII's prohibition of religious discrimination 
for a parochial school to discharge a Catholic or a non-Cath- 
olic teacher who has publicly engaged in conduct regarded 
by the school as inconsistent with its religious princi- 
ples."ls3 
The Third Circuit made the correct inquiries and re- 
spected the autonomy of religions to fulfill their mission. 
The court stated that governmental infringement on a n  
activity with "any religious significance" is "constitutionally 
suspect" and probably "f~rbidden."'~ Courts should not at- 
tempt to determine the religious significance of an  employ- 
ment activity to a religion. By validating certain employ- 
ment practices when the employee's activities are sufficiently 
religious, courts interfere with the religion's practice and 
creation of communities to fulfill its mission. The inquiry of 
the court should be whether a certain employment practice 
is religiously based, not whether the employee's activities 
are religiously significant. 
IV. RESOLUTION OF WHETHER A RELIGIOUS EMPLOYER 
SHOULD BE GIVEN AUTONOMY TO PRACTICE 
ITS RELIGION THROUGH ITS EMPLOYMENT 
PRACTICES THAT VIOLATE TITLE VII 
ON NONRELIGIOUS GROUNDS 
A. Whether the Employee's Activities Are Religious 
Should Not Be Determinative 
The above-cited circuit courts all acknowledge the min- 
isterial exception to Title VII, found in McClure v. Salvation 
Army,135 which allows religious employers to violate Title 
VII on grounds other than religion when the employee's 
activities are rnini~terial. '~~ However, the circuit courts do 
not agree on whether the 1972 amendment to the religious 
employer exemption provides this same protection for reli- 
gious employers when the employee's activities are not min- 
isterial. The 1972 amendment makes no distinction between 
132. Id. a t  951. 
133. Id. 
134. Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1991). 
135. See supra part 1II.A. 
136. Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 947-48 (3d Cir. 1991); EEOC v. PacXic 
Press Publishing Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272, 1278 (9th Cir. 1982). See supra part 111. 
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religious and nonreligious activities, suggesting that the 
activities performed by an employee should not be determi- 
native of the breadth of the exemption. 
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the 
religious employer exemption distinguishes between religious 
and nonreligious activities in Corporation of the Presiding 
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. 
Amos.13' In  that case, the Court held that the religious 
employer exemption applied to employees performing nonreli- 
gious as well as religious activities. A janitor of a church- 
sponsored gymnasium was discharged after not qualifying 
for a temple re~0rnmend.l~~ The Court decided that the 
church had the right to discriminate on the basis of religion 
even if the employee was not performing religious activities. 
While applying the first prong of the Lemon test the Court 
stated: 
[Ilt is a significant burden on a religious organization to 
require it, on pain of substantial liability, to predict which 
of its activities a secular court will consider religious. The 
line is hardly a bright one, and an organization might 
understandably be concerned that a judge would not un- 
derstand its religious tenets and sense of mission.139 
In analyzing the second prong of the Lemon test, the 
Court stated, "A law is not unconstitutional simply because 
it allows churches to advance religion, which is their very 
purpose. For a law to have forbidden 'effects' under Lemon, 
it must be fair to say that the government itself has ad- 
vanced religion through its own activities and infl~ence." '~~ 
This gives great deference to Congress to create exemptions 
for religions from statutes that violate the First Amendment 
religion clauses. The Court further stated, "[Tlhere is ample 
room for accommodation of religion under the Establishment 
Clause. Where, as here, government acts with the proper 
purpose of lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of 
religion, we see no reason to require that the exemption 
come packaged with benefits to secular entities."14' 
137. 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
138. Id. at  330. A temple recommend is "a certificate that [a  person] is a 
member of the Church and eligible to attend its temples." Id. 
139. Id. at 336. 
140. Id. at 337. 
141. Id. at 338 (citations omitted). 
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The Supreme Court did not strictly scrutinize the reli- 
gious employer exemption but rather applied a rational re- 
lationship test. The Court stated: 
[Wlhere a statute is neutral on its face and motivated by 
a permissible purpose of limiting governmental interference 
with the exercise of religion, we see no justification for 
applying strict scrutiny to a statute that passes the Lemon 
test. The proper inquiry is whether Congress has chosen a 
rational classification to further a legitimate end.142 
The Court is again deferring to Congress to create exemp- 
tions for religions in an effort t o  accommodate religious free 
exercise. The Court seems to be acknowledging the right of 
religious autonomy over the pursuit of its goals and mission 
through employment practices. On the facts of this case, the 
Supreme Court is protecting the religion's right to evince its 
religious beliefs through its employment practices regardless 
of the nature of the activities involved. 
In Amos, the Supreme Court found that there is no 
distinction within the religious employer exemption between 
religious and nonreligious activities. Courts should not get 
involved in characterizing whether an activity is central to 
an organization's religious mission. So long as the employ- 
ment practice is religiously based, and not a facade to some 
other interest, it should be given the benefit of the exemp- 
tion, regardless of whether the court objectively values the 
practice or not. This holds true even when the religiously 
based employment practice violates Title VII on nonreligious 
grounds. Under this decision the ministerial exception be- 
comes unnecessary, since there is no longer a distinction 
within the exemption between ministerial and nonministerial 
positions, o r  religious and nonreligious activities. 
B. When Religious Employers Are Able to Prove by Clear 
and Convincing Evidence that Their Employment Practice Is 
Religiously Based, the Court Should Grant the Employer 
the Benefit of the Exemption 
In Little v. Wuerl, the court amplified a test articulated 
in Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day 
~ d v e n t i s t s ' ~ ~  and EEOC v. Mississippi ~ollege.'" It stat- 
142. Id. at 339. 
143. 772 F.2d 1164 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1020 (1986). 
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ed that a religious employer is exempt from Title VII if it 
can show by clear and convincing evidence that its employ- 
ment practice is religiously based. This test seems to meet 
the needs of the two conflicting interests. A religion should 
not be able to violate Title VII except for religious purposes. 
This limitation is stated specifically in the religious exemp- 
tion itself.145 However, if a religious employer by its reli- 
giously based employment practices violates Title VII on 
grounds other than religion, then that  employer must show 
by clear and convincing evidence that its employment prac- 
tices are religiously based. By so doing the employer falls 
under the exemption and the court's scrutiny of the employ- 
ment practice ends. 
The circuit courts are split in determining whether the 
religious employer exemption under Title VII applies to 
employment practices which violate Title VII on a nonreli- 
gious ground. Courts should not try to determine whether 
an employee's activities are central to the religion's mission. 
Rather, the courts should focus on whether the employment 
practice is religiously based. If so, the exemption applies. If 
the employment practice is not religiously based, then the 
religious employer is subject to the dictates of Title VII just 
as any other employer. 
To fall under the religious employer exemption, an em- 
ployer would have to show by clear and convincing evidence 
that its employment practice is religiously based. This show- 
ing values' the state's interest in eliminating employment 
discrimination, while keeping the courts from influencing the 
religion's autonomy to practice its religion as it sees fit and 
pursuing its goals through its employment practices. 
Treaver Hodson 
144. 626 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981). 
145. See 42 U.S.C. $ 2000e-l(a) (West Supp. 1994). 
